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A. Introduction 
Throughout history women have been deprived of their rights and submitted to violence 
in their public and private life. This gendered violence has its roots in the structural 
discrimination suffered by women on the basis of sex. Today, gender-based violence – in all 
its manifestations - remains a grave problem that threatens women’s human rights daily and 
very often systematically, both in times of war and peace.1 
The private environment is also the scene of many abuses against women that often 
are perpetuated in the name of privacy and the family’s autonomy. Significantly, domestic 
violence is widespread worldwide and in an overwhelming number of cases the victims are 
women. This is a direct consequence of the patriarchy that often uses violence to perpetuate 
power relations as a mechanism of social control over women. Moreover, domestic violence 
is a major public health issue that may result in serious physical or psychological harm, being 
one of the main reasons why women lose healthy life years.2 
Furthermore, although in some countries domestic violence is seen in a more brutal 
manner and despite the fact that different factors may trigger it, the issue affects women 
throughout the world, regardless of social class, race or religion. According to the World Health 
Organization, globally around 30% “of all women who have been in a relationship have 
experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner”3. In addition, in times of 
crises these figures are even higher. For instance, since the beginning of the current COVID-
19 global pandemic, in which more than half of the global population were submitted to 
confinement conditions, the number of domestic violence cases reported has significantly 
increased in many countries.4 Notably, the data available on gender-based violence is only 
partially reliable, since for different reasons the issue is highly underreported.  
Violence against women (“VAW”) has had different legal treatments over time, both on 
the domestic as well as at the international level, following the logic of distinct sociocultural 
contexts.  The recognition of domestic violence as a human rights issue was not a simple 
process and only emerged in the early 1990s resulting from the pressure of the feminist 
movement. Since then, the international legal protection for gender-based violence has been 
improving and much has been achieved. Nevertheless, despite all the achievements, violence 
                                                        
1 Peters/Wolper, Introduction, in: Peters/Wolper (eds.), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International 
Feminist Perspectives, 2018, p. 1. 
2 Helweg-Larsen, Violence Against Women in Europe: Magnitude and the Mental Health Consequences 
Described by Different Data Sources, VAWMH 2013, p. 54. 
3  https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/85239/9789241564625_eng.pdf?sequence=1 
(02/11/2020). 
4  https://www.unwomen.org/-
/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/issue-brief-covid-19-and-ending-
violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5006 (02/11/2020). 
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against women still “remains pervasive in all countries of the world, with high levels of 
impunity”5.  
Therefore, this thesis aims to analyse the effectiveness of international human rights 
law (“IHRL”) in protecting women against violence, especially the domestic violence committed 
by men against women. For that reason, the subject is assessed through a comparative 
approach of different international human rights systems around the world - considering their 
mechanisms and jurisprudence. 
Section B describes a brief background of women’s human rights protection within the 
international community, and how gender-based violence became recognized as a human 
rights violation. It also explains the different terminologies used and the different facets by 
which domestic violence can be manifested. Finally, it discusses the challenges faced by the 
issue, in particular the relation of the public-private dichotomy theory with the topic and some 
of the reasons why these abuses are underreported.  
Sections C and D are dedicated to the analyses of the different human rights systems. 
First, Section C considers the United Nations and its Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women. Then, in D the issue will be tackled in the light of regional 
human rights mechanisms: Organization of American States (Inter-American Convention on 
the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women), Council of Europe 
(Istanbul Convention) and African Union (Maputo Protocol). Although there are other regional 
organizations tackling VAW, such as the League of Arab States and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, the regional human rights systems here analysed were chosen for 
being more developed.  
In addition, Section E exposes the convergences and divergences between these legal 
systems, assessing how they can learn from and reinforce each other. Despite the 
particularities of each region, human rights are universal rights, which justifies the comparison 
of different international and regional legal jurisdictions, seeking a better interpretation and 
application of values.6 
Finally, Section F discusses the thesis’ conclusions, analysing as to whether IHRL has 
been effective in combating domestic violence. 
                                                        
5 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 35: 
Gender-Based Violence against Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19 of 26/07/2017, 
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
6 Fredman, Comparative Human Rights Law, 2018, p. 6. 
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B. International Protection of Women’s Human Rights and 
Violence Against Women 
I. International Legal Framework Chronology 
Women’s struggle to make their rights recognized and to achieve gender equality has 
always been present in world history. At the international level, legal instruments representing 
this battle started to become more frequent with the establishment of the United Nations 
(“UN”). Since its constitutive Charter7  in 1945, the organization has already indicated its 
concern with gender discrimination and its aim to promote equality.8 In particular, the UN 
Charter encourages the respect, promotion, observance and realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to everyone “without distinction as to [...] sex” (article 1 (3), article 13 
(2), article 55 (c) and article 76 (c). Shortly after, in 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council 
established the Commission on the Status of Women (“CSW”) as a global intergovernmental 
body to be responsible for “promoting women’s rights in political, economic, social, and 
educational fields”9. Consequently, the effects of CSW’s contributions can already be observed 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 (“UDHR”) that was adopted in 1948,11 in which 
the Commission achieved a broader and more inclusive vocabulary for the document’s text, 
changing the initial genders mentioned from solely ‘men’ to ‘human being’ or ensuring the use 
of both ‘men’ and ‘women’. 12  In addition, in article 2 the UDHR reinforced the gender 
discrimination concerns already expressed in the UN Charter and stated that the rights and 
freedoms present in the declaration are inherent to everyone, without any distinction, “such as 
[...] sex”.  
However, both above-mentioned instruments, even though important and significant, 
did not sufficiently address women’s rights.13 Later, in the 1960s and 1970s other important 
milestones for the empowerment of women were achieved.  Firstly, in 1966 two UN treaties 
came into being intending to better specify States’ human rights obligations: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.14 Both legal documents stated precisely in their article 3 that State signatories 
must “ensure equal right of men and women to the enjoyment”15 of the rights protected in the 
                                                        
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24/10/1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
8  Hellum/Aasen, Introduction, in: Hellum/Aasen (eds.), Women’s Human Rights - CEDAW in 
International, Regional and National Law, 2013, p. 1. 
9 ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, of 21.06.1946, Res. 11(II). 
10 UNGA Res. 217 A (III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10/12/1948, UN Doc. A/RES/3/217A. 
11 Edwards, Violence Against Women under International Human Rights Law, 2011, p. 76. 
12 Adami, Women and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2018, p. 7. 
13 Miller, Sexuality, Violence against Women, and Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies 
Get Protection, HHR 2004, p. 20. 
14 Hellum/Aasen, (fn. 8), p. 2. 
15 UNGA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16/12/1966, UNTS 999, p. 171, article 3; 
UNGA International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16/12/1966, UNTS 993, p. 3, 
article 3. 
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treaties. Then, in 1967 the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”), demanding the States to 
take “all appropriate measures [...] towards the eradication of prejudice and the abolition of 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women”16. 
Additionally, between 1975 and 1985 the UN declared it to be the decade of women and during 
this time the organization held the first three ‘World Conference on Women’, international 
meetings to discuss women’s human rights issues.17 
Nevertheless, there was still an absence of an international treaty that addressed 
human rights from a woman’s point of view, tackling the inequalities and violence experienced 
by women “by reason only of their being women”18. In that context, in 1979 the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women19 (“CEDAW”) redefined IHRL 
through a female perspective and it is considered to be the “international bill of rights for 
women”20. Notably, the convention was initially silent in regard to VAW and has made no 
express mention to the issue in the instrument,21 despite later attempts to correct this gap, 
mainly through the General Recommendation 19 issued by the convention Committee.22 
Whereas violence against women was already a major concern within the international 
community, as it was observed in the Third World Conference of Women in 1985 that 
recognized the issue as such, the theme was still diminished as a ‘women issue’, yet being 
necessary to remedy the lack of international legal provision addressing it.23 Thus, in 1993 the 
UN held in Vienna the World Conference of Human Rights, in which women’s rights had a 
special voice and VAW was finally recognized as a human rights violation.24 Consequently, in 
the same year the UNGA issued the resolution 48/104 named ‘Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women’25 (“DEVAW”), under some criticisms and concerns that a non-
                                                        
16  UNGA Res. 2263 (XXII) Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women of 
07/11/1967, UN Doc. A/RES/22/2263, article 3. 
17  De Tilio, Marcos legais internacionais e nacionais para o enfrentamento à violência contra as 
mulheres: Um percurso histórico, RGPP 2012, p. 74. 
18 Cook, Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, in: Cook (ed.), Human Rights of 
Women: National and International Perspectives, 1994, p.3.  
19 UNGA, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18/12/1979, 
UNTS 1249, p. 13. 
20 Da Silva et al., A Interface entre Gênero e Direito – Entrevista com Alda Facio, CDG 2018, p. 188 et 
seqq. 
21 Byrnes/Bath, Violence against Women, the Obligation of Due Diligence, and the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women - Recent 
Developments, HRLR 2008, p. 518. 
22 See Section C, p. 11. 
23 Miller, Sexuality, Violence against Women, and Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies 
Get Protection, HHR 2004, p. 20 et seqq. 
24 Marks, Nightmare and Noble Dream: the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, CLJ 1994, p. 59; 
Boyle, Stocktaking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993, PS 1995, 
p. 91. 
25 UNGA Res. 48/104 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20/12/1993, UN 
Doc. A/RES/48/104. 
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binding instrument could be used as an excuse by CEDAW States parties to claim that under 
the convention combating VAW is not a binding obligation.26     
Overall, the DEVAW was the first international document that explicitly recognized 
VAW as human rights and fundamental freedom violation,27 linking the cause and permanency 
of the systematic violence suffered by the female sex to the gender inequalities and women’s 
historical subservient position to men.28 Furthermore, the declaration established an agenda 
for action and gave a clear definition of the different ways the violation can happen.  
II. Definitions and Terminologies 
According to the DEVAW (article 1), violence against women means: “any act of 
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life”29. Based on that, we highlight some points of 
this definition: first, the DEVAW considers multiple levels of violence, not limiting the scope to 
physical violence but also including sexual and psychological; it also defines that VAW not only 
happens when a harm effectively occurs, a ‘threat’ is enough to configure the violation; and 
finally, it expressly covers acts that take place in private life.30 
The above-mentioned definition represents the international general understanding for 
VAW and the UN has reproduced it ever since.31 For instance, in 1995 the organization held 
the Fourth World Conference on Women, an occasion that was adopted as the ‘Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action’32. The instrument flagged VAW as one of its twelve critical 
areas of concern and replicated the same definition of VAW brought by the DEVAW. Likewise, 
in 2012 the UNGA again used this interpretation in its Resolution 67/144 on the ‘Intensification 
of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women’33. 
Moreover, the international definition of VAW also elucidates that the violation can 
occur in, but is not limited to, three different spheres: within the family, the general community 
or by the States (DEVAW, article 2). When the abuse happens in the family it is commonly 
called “domestic violence”. In particular, the UN explains, “domestic violence is violence that 
occurs within the private sphere, generally between individuals who are related through blood 
                                                        
26 Byrnes/Bath, (fn. 21), p. 518. 
27 Goldsheid, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, in: Smith (ed.), The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Women in World History - Vol. 2, 2008, p.18. 
28 Ertürk/Purkayastha, Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the special rapporteur 
on violence against women, CS 2012, p. 144. 
29 DEVAW, (fn. 25), article 1. 
30 Russo, Violence against women: A global health issue, in Jing et al. (eds.), Progress in Psychological 
Science Around the World, Vol. 2 Social and Applied Issues, 2018, p. 242. 
31 Russo, (fn. 30), p. 242; Edwards, (fn. 11), p. 21. 
32  UNCONF. 177/20, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 15/09/1995, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.177/20 
33 UNGA Res. 67/144, Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women of 
20/12/2012, UN Doc. A/RES/67/144. 
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or intimacy” 34 . Further, domestic violence not only encompasses an intimate partner 
relationship, but the abuse can also be directed against children or elderly people. 
Among the distinct facets of domestic violence, we draw attention to the abuses 
committed by a male partner or former partner against a woman; a clear and severe 
consequence of patriarchy. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) defines that Intimate 
Partner Violence (“IPV”)  “refers to a behaviour by an intimate partner or ex-partner that causes 
physical, sexual or psychological harm, including physical aggression, sexual coercion, 
psychological abuse and controlling behaviours”35. Although IPV is not restricted to women as 
victims and men as perpetrators, which means the violation per se is gender neutral, the 
overwhelming number of cases demonstrates an abuse committed by a male intimate partner 
or ex-partner against a woman.36 The UN recognizes the matter as “one of the most common 
and least visible forms of violence against women”37 that still is wrongly considered a private 
matter by some countries.38  
In addition, IPV is a worldwide issue that occurs in all societies, indifferent of social 
class, religion, race or economic system, many resulting in several health and psychological 
consequences in women’s life, notably harsher than when men suffer the same abuse. 39 40 
Statistics of the WHO demonstrate the gravity of the problem: 38% of all women’s murders 
across the world are perpetrated by male intimate partner.41 
Thus, for the purpose of this paper we are going to use the terms IPV and Domestic 
Violence as interchangeable, but always in regard to an abusive behaviour committed by men 
towards women in an intimate relationship. 
III. Types of abuses 
As mentioned before, IPV can take many forms and does not happen exclusively 
through physical assaults, but the abuser can also use different forms to establish his 
domination, either by sexual, economic or psychological abuses, as well as any combination 
of these.42 
                                                        
34  UNGA Res. 58/147, Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women of 22/12/2003, UN Doc. 
A/RES/58/147, para. 1 (a) 
35 Garcia-Moreno et al., Understanding and addressing violence against women – Intimate Partner 
Violence, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77432/WHO_RHR_12.36_eng.pdf 
(02/11/2020). 
36 Ibid. 
37 UNGA Res. 58/147, (fn. 34), para. 1 (b). 
38 UNGA Res. 58/147, (fn. 34), 4 (b). 
39 Jansen et al., Prevalence of intimate partner violence: findings from the WHO multi-country study on 
women's health and domestic violence, TL 2006, p. 1267. 
40 Krantz/Garcia-Moreno, Violence against women, JECH 2005, p. 820. 
41 WHO, (fn. 3). 
42 Lockton/Ward, Domestic Violence, 2016, p. 7. 
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1. Physical Violence 
Domestic violence very often threatens women’s physical integrity. The definition of 
physical violence in our context involves any intentional act of force or power against women’s 
physical integrity that results, or has the potential of resulting in physical injury, death or 
another harm, such as hitting, slapping, beating, burning, kicking or any other act attempted 
against a woman’s body.43 Notably, a study from the WHO shows that women that have been 
physically or sexually assaulted by an intimate partner have higher rates of some severe health 
issues.44  
2. Psychological/Emotional Violence 
 Emotional abuses can be manifested in several ways, “such as, belittling, constant 
humiliation, intimidation (e.g. destroying things), threats of harm, threats to take away 
children”45.  In these instances, women are constantly depreciated through a controlling male 
behaviour, involving verbal offenses and/or restrictions. As a result of emotional violence, 
women’s self-esteem, confidence and independence are directly affected, helping to maintain 
the male dominance in the relationship and also interfering in the victims’ decision to leave the 
abusive relationship.46 
Psychological violence is usually more difficult to identify than physical or sexual 
violence,47 since the abuse often starts in a subtle way and gradually becomes more serious. 
Nevertheless, emotional abuse is considered to be present in almost all the cases of domestic 
violence,48 and it may have equal damaging effects for the victims, being in some situations 
even more harmful with long-term consequences, such as mental illness or a negative 
economic impact.49  
3. Sexual Violence 
Intimate-partner sexual violence happens when a man forces a woman to have sexual 
intercourse or any other sexual persuasion, with him or someone else, without her consent. At 
national levels, these violations sometimes are not completely or properly criminalized, as a 
result of cultural tolerance and imposition that women should be submissive to men, sex being 
                                                        
43 Krantz et al., Intimate partner violence: forms, consequences and preparedness to act as perceived 
by healthcare staff and district and community leaders in a rural district in northern Vietnam, PH 2005, 
p. 1051. 
44 Garcia-Moreno et al., Understanding and addressing violence against women – Intimate Partner 
Violence, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77432/WHO_RHR_12.36_eng.pdf 
(02/11/2020). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Lockton/Ward, Domestic Violence, 2016, p.10. 
47 Estefan et al., Depression in Women Who Have Left Violent Relationships: The Unique Impact of 
Frequent Emotional Abuse, VAW 2016, p. 1409. 
48 Krantz et al., (fn. 43), p. 1052. 
49 Estefan et al., (fn. 47), p. 1399/1409. 
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one of their duties in a relationship, especially in a marriage.50 Moreover, research indicates 
that intimate partners are the perpetrators in about one third of sexual abuse cases and the 
issue still remains in some countries not properly legally addressed as rape.51 Therefore, 
feminist movements have been fighting for a worldwide marital rape criminalization, a 
fundamental step towards female independence and bodily integrity.52 
4. Economic Violence 
IPV can also be characterized by economic abuses. Another characteristic of the 
patriarchal society is male dominance in the economic sphere, leading to women’s financial 
dependence in a direct or indirect way. This dependence results in a serious barrier for women 
to leave an abusive relationship, which can also lead to physical or psychological health 
harm.53 
 In this context, economic violence occurs when financial sources or goods are used 
as a form of control in a relationship, restricting or subordinating the woman to do something.54 
The abuses can happen either through financial control, financial exploitation or sabotage of 
women’s efforts to study or work.55 
IV. Challenges 
1. Public/Private dichotomy 
The public/private dichotomy was for a long time a barrier for human rights law and 
remains a controversial issue. International law is based on the idea of liberal States that are 
independent, free and should be the primary subjects of law in this area. 56 Likewise, 
international human rights law was founded following the liberal model and therefore only 
States or someone representing them could be considered as a human rights violator.57 At first 
glance these premises lead to the idea that all the acts happening within the private sphere 
are exempted from State control and therefore not binding at international level. However, 
                                                        
50 Venkatehsh/Randall, Normative and International Human Rights Law Imperatives for Criminalising 
Intimate Partner Sexual Violence: The Marital Rape Impunity in Comparative and Historical Perspective 
in: Randall et al. (eds.), The Right to Say No – Marital Rape and Law Reform in Canada, Ghana, Kenya 
and Malawi, p. 46 et seqq. 
51  Bagwell-Gray et al., Intimate Partner Sexual Violence: A Review of Terms, Definitions, and 
Prevalence, TVA 2015, p. 317. 
52 Venkatehsh/ Randall, (fn. 50), p. 42 ff.  
53 Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, VAW 2008, p. 568. 
54 Sanders, Economic abuse in the lives of women abused by an intimate partner: a qualitative study, 
VAW 2015, p. 4.  
55 Anitha, Intersectional Lens: Financial Abuse, Control, and Exploitation of Women’s Productive and 
Reproductive Labor, VAW 2019, p. 1855 et seqq. 
56 McQuigg, International Human Rights Law and Domestic Violence: The Effectiveness of international 
human rights law, 2011, p. 5. 
57  Libal/Parekh, Reframing Violence Against Women as a Human Rights Violation: Evan Stark’s 
Coercive Control, VAW 2009, p. 1480. 
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IHRL, as an exception, opposed this rule of horizontal application “and introduced a quasi-
vertical system of state responsibility for individual rights”58.   
Nevertheless, this dichotomy is especially problematic in the context of domestic 
violence that for a long time was seen as an intimate life problem, in which the States should 
not intervene. Since the subject in some countries is still characterized strictly as a private 
issue, recognizing them as a human rights violation may be a challenge. Indeed, the initial 
interpretation of IHRL that does not consider private actors as human rights’ violators leaves 
domestic violence out of the scope of protection of this area.59 However, the poor background 
of assistance States have given to women in the private sphere and the way families are 
structured, has over time reverberated in the inequalities observed in public relations,60 which 
means that hierarchical gender inequalities in private relations jeopardizes women’s 
participation in public life. 
In this sense, patriarchy is still a social system largely present in families around the 
world and gender stereotypes are rooted in many cultures and traditions, leading us to believe 
that women are naturally domestic and therefore responsible for home activities and 
offspring,61 while men are natural family leaders. As a consequence, the position of woman in 
society “is still viewed as inevitable or natural rather than as a politically constructed reality 
maintained by patriarchal interests, ideology, and institutions”62. Notably, even though women 
nowadays have a much stronger and more active participation in public life, they still deal with 
stigmas, prejudices and unequal life conditions e.g. lower salaries. Hence, these family/private 
relations should not be analysed separately from a political nature.  
Therefore, how can domestic violence be addressed under international human rights 
law? Firstly, although States are not directly liable for private citizen’s acts, they can be held 
responsible for domestic violence when systematically failing to protect women, by either not 
creating appropriate laws for that or not effectively applying them.63 Secondly, it is also argued, 
although hard to measure, that States are accountable for the traditions, beliefs and customs 
that permeate a given society;64 in other words, the structural reasons that are both the cause 
and consequence of domestic violence. Finally, the reframing of domestic violence as a human 
                                                        
58 Edwards, (fn. 11), p. 65. 
59 Libal/Parekh, (fn. 57), p. 1480. 
60 Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in: Peters/Wolper (eds.), Women’s 
Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, 2018, p. 14. 
61 Biroli/ Miguel, Feminismo e Política – Uma introducāo, 2014 p. 16. 
62 Bunch, (fn. 60), p. 14 et seqq. 
63  Friedman, Women’s Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in: Peters/ Wolper (eds.), 
Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, 2018, p. 21; Libal/ Parekh, (fn. 
57), p. 1482. 
64 Libal/Parekh, (fn. 57), p. 1483. 
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rights issue happened due to the feminist struggle to broaden the interpretation of State’s due 
diligence and the characterization of the issue as a political act, like any other act of violence.65 
Furthermore, there are some important precedents that reinforce the above-mentioned 
arguments and the UN has already in some cases expressed their concern about the issue. 
For instance, the CEDAW’s General Recommendation 19 recognized States’ responsibilities 
for private acts “if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to 
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation”66. Likewise, the 
DEVAW established that in order to eliminate VAW States should “exercise due diligence to 
prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence 
against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons”67. In 
addition, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras68, a 
case of forced disappearance, recognized the State responsibility for a human rights violation 
committed by a private actor,69 “not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due 
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it”70.  
Overall, despite these remarkable recognitions there is still a strong resistance from 
the States to recognize their responsibilities for actions that happened in the private sphere, 
since their acceptance of this would significantly increase their duties. Additionally, it is argued 
that human rights law, whereas not completely excluding violations against women occurring 
in the private sphere from its competence, rather, it focuses its aim almost strictly to cases in 
which a State is the direct party, using the public/private dichotomy in a timely manner to 
abstain from women’s issue when opportune.71 
2.  Unreported cases 
Another challenge related to ending domestic violence is the fact that the issue remains 
highly underreported to authorities and the number of victims seeking help from health 
professionals is significantly low.72 According to the UN, only 40% of women victims of violence 
seek help, and only 10% seek police assistance.73 There are several different and complex 
factors that account for that and here we mention some of them. Firstly, since these violations 
                                                        
65 Morgaine, “You Can’t Bite the Hand…” Domestic Violence and Human Rights, AJWSW 2009, p. 32; 
García-Del Morala/ Dersnah, A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private divide: 
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66 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: 
Violence against women of 1992, UN Doc. A/47/38, para. 19. 
67 DEVAW, (fn. 25), art. 4 (c). 
68  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, (Ser. C) No. 4, 
29/07/1988. 
69 Morgaine, (fn. 65), p. 32. 
70 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (fn. 68), para. 172. 
71 Edwards, (fn. 11), 69. 
72 Yamawaki et al., Perceptions of Domestic Violence: The Effects of Domestic Violence Myths, Victim’s 
Relationship With Her Abuser, and the Decision to Return to Her Abuser, JIV 2012, p. 3206. 
73 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/worldswomen.html (02/11/2020).  
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take place within a domestic environment, many women who pass through it believe this is 
normal, an intrinsic part of their lives, which means many times they do not even realize they 
are in a situation of IPV and therefore do not seek help, believing that nothing can be done on 
their behalf.74 This lack of knowledge is due to cultural traditions, norms and social beliefs that 
perpetuate women´s subordination to men, thereby helping to maintain violence against 
women. Secondly, the victim of domestic violence is very often considered guilty for causing 
the perpetrator’s violent act. As a consequence, fearing to be criticized or blamed, many 
victims do not report the abuses and this also reinforces a self-blaming feeling, making it more 
difficult to overcome what happened.75 In addition, other reasons for the victim’s silence may 
also include concerns with child safety, economic dependence and fear of the abuser being 
even more violent.76  
To sum up, victims of domestic violence face many barriers to leave the abusive 
relationship and seek help. Therefore, it is important to diminish the social intolerance and 
prejudices that permeate the issue through public policies that educate society as well as to 
raise awareness of the legal remedies and health assistance available.77 
 
C. Global Mechanism – United Nations and The Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979) 
I. CEDAW Overview 
As previously mentioned, 78  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women is the first binding international treaty that condemns 
discrimination against women, both in public and private. The convention promotes women’s 
rights by seeking gender equality, while it represses all kind of discrimination against women 
that may occur in the States parties.79 Therefore, the CEDAW is a landmark instrument of 
women empowerment throughout the world and it is considered to be the women’s Magna 
Carta.80 
                                                        
74 Hegarty et al., Effect of Type and Severity of Intimate Partner Violence on Women’s Health and 
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The CEDAW currently has one hundred and eighty-nine States Parties and ninety-nine 
signatories.81 Sadly, while being a highly ratified convention, the CEDAW has received, in 
contrast, a great number of reservations, regularly to its core provisions, such as article 16 that 
addresses equality within the family relations and marriage. Additionally, these reservations 
are often vague and difficult to interpret, which seems to be an attempt by some States to 
abstain from important obligations present in the Convention.82 The CEDAW Committee has 
already declared that some reservations are impermissible under CEDAW’s article 28 (2), and 
the body is constantly requiring States to withdraw these reservations, both through General 
Recommendations, as well as while dialoguing with States Parties during the examination of 
their States Reports. Notwithstanding, the excessive number of reservations to the CEDAW 
remains a major obstacle to the enforcement of the Convention in some countries. 
The preamble of the convention points out that the modification of the traditional role of 
men and women “in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality”83, since gender 
stereotypes strongly impact inequalities. This is of particular importance considering that many 
forms of VAW that undermine women’s integrity are justified by religion, traditions, customs or 
values. Further, convention is divided into six parts with a total of thirty articles. Part I has more 
generic provisions, with definitions and an agenda of obligations; Part II is dedicated to civil 
and political rights; Part III focuses on social, cultural and economic equality; Part IV discusses 
legal equality; Part V is related to the monitoring Committee; and Part VI has the final 
provisions.84 
Despite the undoubted value of the CEDAW, the convention’s original text does not 
categorically consider gender violence as a form of discrimination against women, with no 
express mention of it in the whole convention. Thus, it is clear the initial focus of the instrument 
was to tackle discrimination in public life, with little attention to women’s private sphere.85 This 
neglect considerably limits the protection guaranteed by the treaty, since at first it leaves out 
of its regulation one of the most serious structural discriminations suffered by women 
worldwide.  
Nevertheless, this absence can be explained if we consider the general understanding 
of VAW within the international community by the time the CEDAW was established – when 
the issue was not yet fully recognized as a human rights violation. Moreover, it is argued that 
international actions aiming to combat VAW would only be possible after women’s equality has 
                                                        
81 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en 
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82 Keller, The Impact of States Parties’ Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discriminations Against Women, MSLR 2014, p. 316. 
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been internationally accepted and formally recognized as a human right, thus being used as 
benchmark to access gender-based violence.86 
Later there have been some attempts to amend this gap by the CEDAW Committee, 
mainly by issuing General Recommendations that extended the Convention’s scope.87 The 
decision to address VAW through a broader interpretation of the CEDAW seemed to be more 
appropriate than drafting a new treaty specifically for the issue, which could face resistance by 
member States.88 Notwithstanding the above, this position is arguable and some scholars 
criticize the lack of normative strength of general recommendations, claiming the necessity of 
a new treaty with legally binding obligations addressing violence against women.89  
In this sense, in 2016 the current ‘Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences’ (“UN SRVAW”), Dubravka Šimonović, called upon submissions 
from civil society “on the adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against 
women”90, in order to inquire whether a new UN treaty specifically for VAW is necessary. After 
analysing divergent responses, in her report submitted to the UNGA the UN SRVAW 
concluded that “a separate treaty would expose the existing legal framework under the 
Convention on violence against women to the risk of isolating provisions aimed at addressing 
gender-based violence against women from the structural causes of discrimination against 
women”91. She also pointed out that a global implementation plan on VAW and a new optional 
protocol to the CEDAW could be possible responses to adapt the legal framework in 
question.92  Hence, in 2018 the UN SRVAW created the Platform of Independent Expert 
Mechanisms on Discrimination and Violence against Women (“EDVAW Platform”) gathering 
seven independent mechanisms93 focused on VAW and discrimination against women, both 
from the UN and regional level, with the aim of joining efforts to “[...] establish deep links 
between them, in order to improve implementation of the existing international legal and policy 
framework on violence and discrimination against women and to reinforce each mechanism’s 
recommendations relating to observed gaps in implementation”94 . Since its creation, the 
EDVAW Platform’s members have been meeting regularly and taking actions towards the 
promotion of women’s human rights and the combat of VAW.  Most recently, on 14 July 2020, 
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87 See section C, II, 2., p. 15-16. 
88 Qureshi, (fn. 85), p. 192. 
89 Ibid, p. 192 et seqq. 
90 UNGA Res. 71/170, Adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women of 
19/07/2017, UN Doc. A/72/134. 
91 Ibid, para. 91. 
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the EDVAW Platform issued a statement on “Covid-19 and the increase in violence and 
discrimination against women” 95, requesting the States to adopt urgent measures in response 
to the recent pandemic crisis and the dramatic increase in domestic violence cases worldwide.  
All in all, the CEDAW is an important instrument in combating VAW and the work of its 
Committee resulted in a strong jurisprudence in gender-based violence, thus showing the living 
nature of the convention. 
II. Mechanisms of Control 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW 
Committee”) is the body designated for ensuring the CEDAW’s implementation and it is 
composed of twenty-three experts elected by member States (CEDAW, article 17, 1.). The 
CEDAW Committee has mainly four duties. The first two are established by the CEDAW: the 
Committee analyses reports periodically submitted by State parties (CEDAW, article 18) and 
issues General Recommendations (CEDAW article 21, 1.). In addition, the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women96 (“OP-
CEDAW”) is a procedural addendum that strengthened and complemented the CEDAW,97 
broadening the Committee’s duties through the establishment of two other mechanisms of 
control in the combating of discrimination against women: Individual Complaints (OP-CEDAW, 
article 2) and an Inquiry Procedure (OP-CEDAW, article 8). 
The OP-CEDAW was adopted on 6 October 1999 and came into force on 22 December 
2000, and it has currently one hundred and fourteen States Parties and eleven signatories.98 
The protocol is an international treaty that State parties must ratify separately from the CEDAW 
to be bound by its provisions. After its establishment, the CEDAW became more aligned with 
the other UN treaties’ monitoring systems.  
1. States Report 
The primary CEDAW monitoring mechanism is the examination of the State Reports,99 
in which State parties are obliged to update the Committee through regular reports concerning 
measures adopted regarding the implementation of the convention, achievements and 
challenges faced (CEDAW, article 18). Therefore, after having this overview about what has 
been done by the States, the Committee is able to elaborate observations and 
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recommendations that may help the States to improve compliance with the Convention.100 
In general, criticisms about the State Reports procedure involve allegations that the 
reports may be biased, since they are drafted by States that may hide important information 
when convenient. In addition, whilst it is argued that the procedure is too bureaucratic with a 
great lack of States’ compliance and frequent delays in submission, there are also delays by 
the Committee in analysing the reports, which results in a considerable time gap between the 
reports’ submission and their consideration, thus compromising the credibility of the 
procedure.101 
2. General Recommendations 
The CEDAW Committee is also entitled to make general comments to clarify 
substantial or procedural provisions, thus giving a deeper interpretation of the Convention on 
a given subject that later may help State parties to improve their reports.102 The Convention 
provides that the Committee “may make suggestions and general recommendations”103 based 
on the State Reports or other information received by the States. 
So far, the Committee has developed thirty-seven General Recommendations which 
became an important part of the Committee’s work on the CEDAW’s implementation. 104 
Despite not being a treaty, the CEDAW Committee considers General Recommendations to 
be authoritative statements and it is constantly ruling and referring to them.105  This is a 
controversial issue since the General Recommendations are not treaties and were not ratified, 
therefore, they are not strictly binding.106  
Nevertheless, it was initially through the instrument of General Recommendation that 
the Committee tried to redress the lack of provisions related to VAW in the CEDAW. Firstly, 
the General Recommendation 12 107  (1989) required the States to include information 
regarding VAW in their periodic reports to be submitted to the Committee. However, the 
document was limited and did not explain how VAW was part of the CEDAW’s scope.108 Later, 
the General Recommendation 19 (“GR 19”) addressed the issue more widely, adopting a new 
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approach to the CEDAW in a way that some articles of the Convention started to be interpreted 
as encompassing VAW.109  
In addition, the GR 19 recognizes that “Family violence is one of the most insidious 
forms of violence against women. It is prevalent in all societies. Within family relationships 
women of all ages are subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, rape, other forms 
of sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated by traditional 
attitudes”110 . Further, the GR19 recommends that States “should report on the extent of 
domestic violence and sexual abuse, and on the preventive, punitive and remedial measures 
that have been taken”111. 
Therefore, the GR 19 enlarges the definition of discrimination against women and 
became the basis of the Committee’s work in gender-based violence, being the most cited 
general recommendation on the subject, both in the Committee’s concluding observations 
towards State Reports, as well as within its views regarding individual complaints.112 Moreover, 
the relevance of the document can also be observed in the case law from different judicial 
systems - national and regional - mentioning the GR19.113 
Furthermore, twenty-five years after its adoption, in 2017 the UN updated the GR 19 
with the General Recommendation 35 (“GR 35”). The rationale for this review was to provide 
a further guide to States parties, considering that despite all the work that had been done to 
combat it, gender based violence “remains pervasive in all countries, with high levels of 
impunity”114 . In particular, the GR 35 acknowledges the structural roots of gender-based 
violence (para. 10 and 19) and has a strong intersectional approach for tackling the issue, 
recognizing “that gender-based violence may affect some women to different degrees, or in 
different ways, meaning that appropriate legal and policy responses are needed”115. In regard 
to the acts committed by private citizens, the GR 35 is much more assertive than the GR 19, 
specifying States’ due diligence obligations in more detail.116 
3. Individual Complaints 
The OP-CEDAW enables individual women or groups of women to access international 
justice by submitting communications to the CEDAW’s Committee, by means of alleging 
violations by the State parties against her/their rights protected by the CEDAW. The 
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communications may be submitted also “on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals”117, 
with due consent, which allows non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) to represent the 
victims. In addition, the individual complaints’ admissibility criteria require that before the 
submission of a communication to the Committee, all available domestic remedies have to be 
exhausted, unless the State’s lack of effective remedies is proved (OP-CEDAW, article 4). 
Notably, most of the Communications analysed by the CEDAW Committee involve 
gender-based violence.118 A.T. v. Hungary119 was the first Communication the Committee 
ruled on the issue and which became a key case, very often referred to in future decisions. In 
its view, the CEDAW Committee mentioned the GR 19, reiterating that gender-based violence 
is encompassed by the CEDAW’s definition of discrimination and that “States may also be 
responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or 
to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation”120. The committee 
has found that the absence of specific legislation in Hungary regarding domestic violence and 
sexual harassment constitutes a violation of the victims’ “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, particularly her right to security of person”121. Therefore, it was considered that 
Hungary had not fulfilled its obligations under the CEDAW and had violated the complainant’s 
rights recognized under articles 2 (a), (b) and (e), along with articles 5 and 16. 
In addition, the case Angela González Carreño vs. Spain122 is a well-illustrated case of 
domestic violence against women and girls. The victim separated from her husband (F.R.C.) 
in 1999 after years of suffering physical and psychological abuse. In the following years, the 
violations persisted and F.R.C. also started to practice parental alienation with the daughter 
Andrea. The victim sought help from the Spanish authorities, which ultimately failed to protect 
the mother and her daughter’s rights, resulting in F.R.C. murdering the child and committing 
suicide. The Committee ruled that the State violated the mother and her (deceased) child’s 
rights under CEDAW articles 1, article 2 (a)-(f), article 5 (a) and article 16, 1. (d), along with 
the Committee's GR 19.  
On the whole, the CEDAW Committee has been developing concise jurisprudence 
through the individual complaints and contributing to the development of women’s human 
rights, especially clarifying how the CEDAW is applicable to domestic violence cases and the 
extent of States’ due diligence in these cases.123  
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4. Inquiry Procedure 
The second mechanism that the OP-CEDAW came up with is the inquiry procedure. 
This procedure grants the Committee wide powers to initiate confidential investigations when 
it has reliable information of serious or systematic violations of women's human rights 
committed by a State that ratified the protocol (OP-CEDAW, article 8, 1.). After the relevant 
information is received, the Committee may instruct one or more of its experts to directly carry 
out an investigation and, if justified and always with the due consent of the affected State, the 
investigation may include an on-site visit (OP-CEDAW, article 8, 2.). Then, after the Committee 
considers the investigation’s findings, it will submit a final report with comments and 
recommendations to be sent to the investigated State, which will then have six months to 
present its owns observations (OP-CEDAW, article 8, 3.). The Committee may also ask the 
State to include in its next periodic report the measures adopted in regard of the investigation 
(OP-CEDAW, article 9, 1.). 
Furthermore, while the OP-CEDAW does not allow States to make reservations (OP-
CEDAW, article 17), it is possible to opt out of the inquiry procedure (OP-CEDAW, article 10). 
Therefore, State parties can express that they do not recognize the Committee’s competence 
to conduct these inquiries by making a declaration under the afore-mentioned article at the 
time of ratification of the Protocol.124 This paper argues that this clause adds a weakness to 
the OP-CEDAW, limiting its effectiveness to combat women rights’ violations, since any 
country, at its own will, can avoid the application of an important procedure of control. Yet, this 
was the price to pay for inducing more States to ratify the OP-CEDAW. 
So far the Committee has concluded only five inquiries - Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, 
Philippines, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and Canada - all of which were triggered 
by NGOs requests. In Kyrgyzstan’s inquiry procedure, the CEDAW Committee received 
information in 2013 that the country had committed grave and systematic violations when 
failing to prevent and protect victims of bride kidnapping. Despite the case not being directly 
about domestic violence, in the Committee’s report of the inquiry presented in 2018, it is 
pointed out that “domestic violence is disproportionately prevalent in forced marriages”125. 
Significantly, the Committee considered that the violations indeed are grave and systematic 
(para. 86 and 87) and found the State had violated the CEDAW under “the right to live free 
from gender-based violence; the right to freely choose a spouse, equal rights within marriage 
and upon its dissolution and prohibition of child and/or forced marriages; and the right to 
access to justice and victim support”126. In its observations, Kyrgyzstan elucidated that since 
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the investigation procedure started it had taken measures to modify its law.127 Among other 
measures, in 2017 the country adopted a new ‘Act of Kyrgyzstan on protection against 
domestic violence’ to amend the gaps of the previous law (para 4).  
Overall, the inquiry procedure is a good alternative for the CEDAW Committee’s 
monitoring system that has resulted in strong jurisprudence and a guide for the application of 
CEDAW provisions.128  However, it is argued the procedure is still underutilized and slow - with 
many steps and very often demanding the States parties’ permission to continue the 
investigation, which results in long intervals. As a consequence, this slowness can be a threat 
to the effectiveness of the inquiry procedure, since the procedure targets ‘grave’ violations.129 
 
D. Regional Mechanisms  
I. Organization of American States – Belém do Pará Convention (1994) 
1. Background 
In order to understand the situation of women within the Americas, it is necessary to 
briefly mention the peculiarities and social-cultural context of the region. In particular, Latin 
America is well known for inequalities and social exclusions, as well as for fragile democracies, 
some of them still in development. In this sense, the unequal wealth concentration present in 
this area contributed to political instability, oppressions and many human rights violations.130 
Significantly, the history of Latin America is marred by authoritarian dictatorship regimes; 
periods in which the most basic human rights were violated, with overwhelming cases of 
arbitrary imprisonment, torture and people who disappeared.131 As a consequence, the culture 
of violence and impunity is widespread in the continent and the threats to these young 
democracies are still a reality, as we can observe in the recent wave of protests trying to avoid 
democratic backsliding in different countries in South America.  
In this context, the Organization of American States (“OAS”) was established by its 
Charter132 on April 30, 1948, with the purpose to promote solidarity and cooperation among 
the American States, thus building a healthy relationship environment in the continent. At the 
same time, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was also adopted, and 
later, the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and the Inter-American Convention 
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to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985). Together, all these instruments became the normative 
basis of the regional human rights system in the Americas, 133  and also recognized core 
provisions related to VAW,134 progressively succumbing to more space for feminist demands 
within public policies. 
Hence, the OAS, through the work of the Inter-American Commission of Women, 
adopted on June 09, 1994 the ‘Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and 
Eradication of Violence against Women’135 (“Belém do Pará Convention”). Remarkably, the 
instrument came into force on 05 March 1995 and was the first international binding treaty in 
the world that ever recognized violence against woman as a human rights violation, specifying 
that “every women has the right to be free of violence in both the public and private spheres”136. 
Therefore, the Belém do Pará Convention is considered to be a historic trailblazer in terms of 
a legal instrument that has given guidelines to States for adopting laws and political strategic 
frameworks on the prevention, eradication and punishment of VAW. In addition, the convention 
has been well ratified by thirty-two States, with only two OAS members not ratifying it (the 
United States and Canada, which both have also not ratified the ACHR).137 
2. Belém do Pará Convention Overview 
The efficiency of the convention revolves around four important points highlighted in its 
preamble that stand as a basis for the interpretation of the instrument: i. VAW is a violation of 
women’s rights and their fundamental freedoms; ii. VAW is “an offense against human dignity 
and a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men”138; 
iii. VAW transcends all social classes; and iv. the eradication of VAW is a condition for women’s 
social and individual development.139 
Moreover, the Belém do Pará Convention defines violence against women as: “any act 
or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm 
or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere”140. Thus, the convention 
adopted a new paradigm for international human rights law, establishing that the private sphere 
is also the responsibility of States and, consequently, it is the States’ responsibility to eradicate 
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and punish VAW.141 Although the convention does not explicitly mention domestic violence, 
the instrument clarifies that VAW shall encompass any act: “that occurs within the family or 
domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator 
shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, including, among others, rape, 
battery and sexual abuse”142. In addition, article 2 also determines that VAW may involve acts 
occurring in the community (para. b), in which the perpetrator may be any person, and acts 
committed by the State or its agents (para. c.). 
Furthermore, the Convention is composed of 25 articles and its structure is the 
following: Chapter I - Definition and Scope of Application; Chapter II – Rights Protected, 
recognizing the vulnerable position of women and thus guaranteeing a significant list of rights 
to be protected; Chapter III - Duties of the States, which differentiates the measures States 
must immediately take (article 7), from measures to be taken progressively (article 8); Chapter 
IV – Inter-American Mechanisms of Protection; and Chapter V – General Provisions. 
Moreover, the Convention does not specifically criminalize any form of violence, but 
rather provides a set of rights to be protected by States in order to guarantee all women a life 
free of violence, expressly including the following rights: the right to life; to freedom and 
security; to physical, mental and moral integrity; to dignity; to equality; and to justice (article 3).  
Finally, the Convention reflects ideas of the ‘intersectionality’ theory, pointing out that 
gender-based violence intersects with other forms of discrimination faced by women, 143 and 
therefore States are required to give special attention to vulnerable women related to race, 
ethnic origin, immigrant, social-economic situation or other reasons (article 9). This is an 
important development considering the already mentioned high number of inequalities and the 
vast number of different ethnic groups present in the geographic area covered by the 
Convention. 
3. Mechanisms of Control 
The Inter-American human rights system has an extensive number of mechanisms of 
control that allowed the Belém do Pará Convention to establish its compliance mechanisms 
through four pillars: the Inter-American Commission of Women; Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights; the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; and the Mechanism to Follow-
Up on Implementation of the Inter American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women.  
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a) Inter-American Commission of Women  
The Inter-American Commission of Women (“CIM”) was the first international body 
established to safeguard “women’s human rights and gender equity and equality”144 and it is 
the main OAS body on the issue.145 Moreover, the CIM is composed of one representative of 
each OAS Member State that will act as political delegates, meeting once every two years. 
Within the Belém do Pará Convention the CIM has competence under article 10 to receive 
national reports submitted by States “on measures adopted to prevent and prohibit violence 
against women”146, as well as the challenges faced during this process. In addition, under 
article 11 the CIM is also entitled to request advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights regarding the clarification of any matter related to the convention.  
b) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”) is the main OAS body, 
with jurisdiction over all the organization’s countries and responsible for promotional and 
contentious duties, being a quasi-judicial body.147 The IACHR is based in Washington, D.C., 
U.S.A. and it is composed of seven experts who must be elected by the OAS States based on 
their profound knowledge of human rights and therefore, they do not represent their home 
country.148 
Significantly, the IACHR has wide duties related to the promotion and protection of 
human rights in the continent and here we briefly mention some of them, relevant in our 
context. Firstly, the IACHR has established Thematic Rapporteurships to dedicate work to 
specific areas of human rights concern involving vulnerable groups;149 with a Rapporteurship 
on the Rights of Women being created in 1994 to analyse the laws and practices related to 
women’s human rights within the OAS member States. Secondly, the IACHR frequently 
publishes Thematic Reports and holds Public Hearings on women’s human rights, especially 
on VAW – both mechanisms often reflecting subjects addressed in individual cases brought 
before the Commission. Thirdly, the IACHR’s experts are also entitled to conduct country visits 
to inquire about States’ compliance with human rights conditions, which are to be followed by 
a report published by the Commission considering the situation, and also public hearings.150 
Finally, the Commission may, by its own initiative or a request of the party involved, when there 
is evidence of imminent threat, demand that the State adopt precautionary measures in serious 
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and urgent cases with a risk of irreparable harm, thus protecting against on-going human rights 
violations. However, this decision shall not be understood as a prejudgment.151 
On the other hand, the IACHR through its adjudicatory role processes complaints of 
human rights violations under the scope of the OAS human rights instruments. After analysing 
the admissibility of the case, the IACHR attempts to establish an amicable solution between 
the parties, and if that is not possible, it will then analyse the merits of the case.152 Further, 
when the denunciation turns out to be true, the IACHR holds the State responsible for the 
violations attributed to it and issues recommendations for remedies. Afterwards, if the 
recommendations are not complied with by the State, the Commission may report the case to 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.  
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the IACHR under the Belém do Pará Convention is 
enabled by article 12, which allows any person, group of person or NGO to address petitions 
denunciating violations under article 7 of the Convention. It is relevant to mention that article 
12 of Belém do Pará Convention while allowing Individual Complaints to be lodged, which is a 
triumph, also limits these complaints to violations of the obligations established by article 7, 
which involves the measures States agreed to take immediately in order to eradicate VAW.  
Therefore, it is beyond the scope of both the Commission and the Court to examine individual 
complaints based on the measures that States agreed to progressively adopt (article 8), as 
well as the intersectional obligations for vulnerable women (article 9).153 Remarkably, article 8 
encompasses important obligations related to the prevention of VAW, such as to adopt 
measures “to promote awareness and observance of the right of women to be free from 
violence [...]”154 and “to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
including the development of formal and informal educational programs [...]”155. Notably, the 
IACtHR has already ruled on the matter in the case Gonzales et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, 
in which it was decided that the Court: “does not have contentious jurisdiction rationae 
materiae to examine alleged violations of Articles 8 and 9 of that international instrument.”156 
Particularly, this paper shares the opinion of some scholars who argue that this limitation of 
competence is a drawback since article 7 cannot be fully understood or enforced without being 
analysed in sync with article 8.157  
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Nevertheless, the IACHR has already in a number of cases ruled on inter-partner 
violence, and recognized the States’ due diligence obligation with regard to these violations.158 
Thus, the first major case brought to the IACHR on the topic was Maria da Penha Maia 
Fernandes v. Brazil, which was also the first case decided under the Belém do Pará 
Convention. This was a case of extreme tolerance from Brazil with the domestic violence 
committed against Maria da Penha by her ex-husband in 1983, which resulted in two murder 
attempts and the victim being left paraplegic. Maria da Penha sought the State’s protection, 
but Brazil systematically failed to give the case a final decision and punish the perpetrator - 
who was only convicted in 2002, nineteen years after the facts occurred, and only after the 
international pressure due to the petition lodged by the victim in the IACHR.159 Within the Inter-
American system, the Commission in 2001 found that Brazil’s negligence and omission led to 
violations of the victim’s rights under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man (article 2 - Right to equal protection under the law without discrimination; and article 8 – 
Right to Justice), the American Convention on Human Rights (article 1 – Obligation to Respect 
Rights; article 8 - Right to a Fair Trial; and article 25 – Right to Judicial Protection), and the 
Belém do Pará Convention (article 7 - States’ obligation to prevent, punish and eradicate 
VAW).160 Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations on the case resulted in Brazil 
adopting a landmark domestic violence law, popularly known as the Maria da Penha Law, 
which was later considered to be one of the most advanced pieces of legislation on domestic 
violence in the world by the United Nations Development Funds for Women.161 Therefore, this 
case demonstrates the positive effect of the Belém do Pará Convention, especially in the law 
and change of policy.  
In addition, another landmark case on domestic violence brought to the Commission is 
Jessica Lenahan Gonzales et al. v. United States of America162. Here the victim claimed, along 
with her three daughters, to be victims of domestic violence perpetrated by her ex-husband 
and father. Although the U.S. has not ratified neither the ACHR, nor the Belém do Pará 
Convention, the IACHR did not refrain from citing the two instruments, and found violations 
under a wide range of provisions of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
- which was interpreted as a binding instrument and through a gendered perspective - 
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concluding that the U.S. failed to act with due diligence to protect Jessica and the children.163 
Therefore, this decision demonstrated that within the Inter-American system, States have a 
due diligence obligation to protect, prevent, investigate and punish domestic violence, 
regardless of the ratification of the Belém do Pará Convention. 
c) Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights (“IACtHR”) is the judicial body that together 
with the IACHR is responsible to safeguard human rights within the Inter-American system. 
The Court was established in 1979 with its headquarters in San José, Costa Rica, and is 
composed of seven judges. Further, the IACtHR is in charge of interpreting and enforcing the 
American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and the other regional specific human rights 
conventions,164 including the Belém do Pará Convention. Like the Commission, the Court also 
has advisory and contentious roles, however here both competences are exclusively 
judicial.165  
Thus the IACtHR, at the request of the OAS bodies or any Member State, can issue 
advisory opinions to clarify the interpretation of the ACHR or any other human rights instrument 
that are part of the Inter-American system.166 Thereby, under the Belém do Pará Convention, 
States Parties and the CIM are entitled to request a legal advisory opinion from the court 
regarding the interpretation of the convention (Article 11). 
Furthermore, the adjudicatory role of the IACtHR is more restricted than within the 
Commission, because here the Court only has competence over cases involving States that 
not only ratified the ACHR, but also expressly accepted the IACtHR’s jurisdiction (ACHR, Art. 
62). Moreover, these cases must be previously processed by the Commission, which also 
decreases the number of cases reaching the Court. Therefore, when the Commission 
addresses a case to the Court, the case will be heard and ruled by the judicial body, which 
later will follow the State’s compliance with its judgments.167 In addition, the IACtHR decisions 
are binding, mandatory and have unappealable legal force (ACHR, articles 67 and 68). 
Furthermore, like the Commission, the IACtHR may, when deemed necessary, adopt 
provisional measures for grave and urgent situations that may cause irreparable damage to 
the victims (ACHR, article 63). Finally, although the Belém do Pará Convention has no express 
mention of the IACtHR jurisdiction, the Court has already ruled affirming its competence with 
regard to violations to the Convention in the case Cotton Field.168  
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d) Mechanism to Follow-Up on Implementation of the Inter American Convention 
on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
(MESECVI) 
In order to evaluate the States’ compliance with the Belém do Pará Convention, the 
‘Mechanism to Follow-Up on Implementation of the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women’ (“MESECVI”) was 
created in 2004, developed by the States Parties as a multilateral, systematic and permanent 
evaluation process. The MESECVI was formed to work together with the IACHR and the 
IACtHR, but so far there has been little interaction between the three bodies.169 In addition, 
MESECVI is composed of two bodies: the Committee of Experts, a technical body responsible 
for the evaluation of implementation of the convention, with members indicated by the member 
States; and the Conference of States Parties, a political body composed of State 
representatives that together shall discuss the fulfilment of the convention and issue 
recommendations to the Committee of Experts.170 
Furthermore, the MESECVI consists of a State report procedure with two phases: i. a 
multilateral evaluation, in which the State’s implementation of the Convention is individually 
examined, followed by the draft of a Hemispheric Report on the regional progress on VAW, 
containing the results and recommendations of the procedure; and ii. a follow-up round to track 
the State’s compliance with progress indicators.171 
II. African Union – Maputo Protocol (2003) 
1. Background 
The situation of women in Africa is a very sensitive issue and women’s rights in the 
continent have been threatened by poverty, armed conflicts, customs, traditions, harmful 
practices, religion, a high prevalence of HIV, difficulties to access education and gender- based 
violence. Consequently, the prevalence of domestic violence in the continent is significantly 
high, while some African countries still do not have laws prohibiting this violation. Research 
conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes demonstrates that in 2017 Africa 
presented the highest level in the world of female homicides committed by intimate partners, 
and these crimes also represented more than two thirds (69%) of all the intentional homicides 
of female victims in the continent.172 
Whereas the pressure of the international community has lead to some African 
countries adopting gender-sensitive national laws, and also ratifying international and regional 
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instruments of women’s human rights protection, it is argued the major problem in protecting 
women in Africa from domestic violence is the fact that these laws and treaties even when 
already ratified are not properly enforced, resulting in mere formalities.173 This lack of law 
enforcement happens largely as a consequence of the conflict of multiple legal systems 
present in the continent, in which religious and customary law often prevail, tolerating violations 
of women’s rights and helping to perpetuate domestic violence.174 
In this context, the African human rights system had its roots back in 1963, when the 
Organisation of African Union (“OAU”) was established by thirty-two African states to promote 
solidarity and unity, and to face the colonialism and neo-colonialism present on the 
continent.175 Initially, the organization’s constitutional charter had no mention of a human rights 
system, which was only officially established in 1981 with the adoption of the ‘African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights’176 (“African Charter”). In 2002 the OAU was replaced by the 
African Union (“AU”) that today is composed by fifty-five member states.  
The African Charter is a very progressive instrument that encompasses a range of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, while it also brings the notion of ‘peoples’ 
rights’.177 However, the instrument has a lack of gender specific provisions, with only one direct 
mention to women’s rights (African Charter, article 18, 3.), and a provision prohibiting 
discrimination based, among others, on sex (African Charter, article 2). 
Therefore, in order to complement the African Charter’s limited women’s human rights 
scope, the ‘Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa’178 (“Maputo Protocol”) was created by the African Union in 2003 and came 
into force in 2005 as a binding instrument.179 So far the Protocol has been signed by forty-nine 
States, of which forty-two have already ratified it.180  
All in all, despite the Maputo Protocol being a landmark progressive instrument for 
African women, the treatment States give to women’s human rights is still precarious. The 
Protocol has some drawbacks that threaten its effectiveness and its usage is still limited. 
Firstly, despite being widely ratified, countries’ domestication of the protocol is still in progress 
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and it is necessary to raise a broader public awareness of the instrument.181 Secondly, it is 
argued that the rights protected in the Maputo Protocol are based on a western idea of 
women’s human rights, while the instrument brings no mention of how its provisions should be 
implemented when in conflict with domestic statutory or customary law.182 Finally, the AU’s 
mechanisms of control still need to be more developed under the scope of the Protocol.  
2. Maputo Protocol Overview 
 The Maputo Protocol recognizes a wide set of rights and determines that “all forms of 
discrimination against women” 183  shall be eliminated, thus perceiving the interconnected 
nature of women’s human rights. 184  In regard to violence against women, the issue is 
addressed in some provisions of the Protocol, with no direct mention of domestic violence. 
According to the instrument, and following the international understanding of the topic, VAW 
means: “all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, 
psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the 
imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or 
public life in peace time and during situations of armed conflicts or of war”185. 
Moreover, the Maputo Protocol correlates the protection against gender-based 
violence with the guarantee of women’s dignity (article 3), their right to life, integrity and 
security (article 4), elimination of harmful practices (article 5) and protection in armed conflicts 
(article 11), comprehensively applying all the necessary elements that contribute to combat 
VAW - prohibition, prevention, sanction and protection - in any of the areas in which it occurs, 
public or private. 
Furthermore, the instrument became the first international instrument that expressly 
regulated and legally banned female genital mutilation,186  requiring the States to take all 
legislative measures to prohibit and punish this violation (article 5, b.). This recognition in an 
international legal binding instrument is a significant achievement considering the continent is 
highly affected by this practice.187 
Despite the lack of express mention of domestic violence in the Protocol, the African 
Union has already demonstrated the organization’s understanding that VAW encompasses 
domestic violence. For instance, in a guide drafted in 2011 by one of the African Commission’s 
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special groups to help member States better implement the African Charter’s provisions,188 
under the ‘Right to Health’ (African Charter, article 16), it is specified that the minimum 
obligation of the provision, among other measures, is to take measures to prevent VAW, 
precisely including domestic violence (para. 67, ii, 1./7.).189 Likewise, the ‘General Comment 
No. 4 on the African Charter’ elucidates that sexual and gender based violence encompass 
physical and psychological acts perpetrated against women, such as domestic violence (para. 
58).190 
In addition, the Maputo Protocol is ground-breaking for women’s reproductive and 
sexual rights provisions, 191  expressly demanding States to adopt measures authorizing 
abortion in cases of sexual abuse, rape, incest, and when the continuation of pregnancy 
endangers the mother's mental and physical health or the life of the foetus (Maputo Protocol, 
article 14, 2.). 
On the whole, other provisions in the protocol include child marriage (article 6, b), 
polygamy (article 6, c), inheritance (article 21), economic empowerment (article 13), 
participation of women in the political process (article 9) and right to education (article 12). 
Notably, the Maputo Protocol recognizes that certain women experience multiple forms of 
discrimination and, consequently, it gives special protection for vulnerable groups: elderly 
women (article 22), women with disabilities (article 23) and women in distress (article 24). 
3. Mechanisms of Control 
 As mentioned before, the Maputo Protocol is intended to supplement the African 
Charter. Therefore, the institutions established to oversee the State’s compliance with the 
African Charter are also monitoring the Maputo Protocol’s implementation.192  
a) African Commission 
The primary monitoring mechanism in the African human rights system is attributed to 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (“African Commission”), an executive 
body mainly responsible for promoting and protecting the human and people’s rights within the 
organization (African Charter, article 30), and also to interpret the African Charter’s provisions 
(African Charter, article 45, 3./4.). The commission’s duties include receiving and evaluating 
States’ reports, examining communications and other promotional roles. 
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Firstly, the African Charter demands that all State parties must submit to the 
Commission “every two years [...] a report on the legislative or other measures”193 on the 
implementation of the instrument. Likewise, this procedure is explicitly provided for in the 
Maputo Protocol, which demands in article 26 (1) that States shall submit the status of the 
implementation of the protocol, simultaneously with the periodic report foreseen in the African 
Charter, both in a single report.194 
Secondly, the African Commission has a protective mandate, in which it is responsible 
for considering individual communications alleging violations of the African Charter, and after 
the assessment of the complaint it shall elaborate recommendations to the Assembly of Heads 
of States and Government of the AU.195 The Maputo Protocol is not clear in regard to individual 
complaints, with no provision extending the Commission’s scope to receive communications 
under the protocol. Nevertheless, it is considered that while lacking a specific provision 
excluding the Commissions’ protective mandate, the body is entitled to analyse individual 
complaints also under the women’s Protocol, by necessary implication due to the 
complementary relation between the two instruments.196  
The African Commission has so far ruled in two cases involving women’s human rights: 
first in 2011, a case of sexual harassment during a public protest (Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights & Interights v. Egypt)197 and then in 2015 in a case of rape and abduction 
(Equality Now and EWLA v. Ethiopia)198. As a result, in both proceedings violations of women’s 
human rights were found to be within the framework of the African Charter. However, none of 
the decisions mentioned the Maputo Protocol, considering Egypt has not yet signed the 
instrument and Ethiopia had not ratified it by the time of the decision. 
  Finally, the African Commission established in 1999 the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, one of the African Commission’s members to be elected for a two-
year term to act as a central point to reinforce and promote women’s human rights in the 
continent, thus focusing attention on African women.199  
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b) African Court 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court“) was established in 
1988 and came into force in 2004 through a Protocol200 to the African Charter. The African 
Court was introduced as complementary body to reinforce the African Commission’s protective 
mandate, being the judicial body with binding decisions.201 Under the Maputo Protocol (article 
27), the African Court also has competence to interpret issues related to the protocol’s 
implementation. 
Significantly, in 2018 the African Court decided for the first time in a case regarding 
violation of the Maputo Protocol (APDF & IHRDA v Republic of Mali)202. The court ruled that 
many articles of the Malian Persons and Family Code were violating the Maputo Protocol for 
the reason of allowing marriage of children under the age of 18 (para. 124 and 135, ix). Thus, 
it was determined that Mali should amend the mentioned code to be in compliance with its 
international obligations, including the Maputo Protocol (para. 135). Yet, this was the only case 
the African Court decided under the Maputo Protocol, although the Court ruled on other cases 
involving women’s human rights in the African Charter’s context. The lack of other decisions 
mentioning the protocol can be justified by the barriers to access the court, especially the 
challenging admissibility criteria that results in many applications not even being considered 
on merits.203  
Nevertheless, despite the limited reference to it in the African Court jurisprudence, other 
courts, both national and international, have been basing their decisions on the Maputo 
Protocol, which shows its positive effect for women’s human rights protection. In the particular 
context of domestic violence, in Naidoo v. Minister of Police204 (2015), the Supreme Court of 
Appeal of South Africa ruled that the police wrongfully reacted to a complaint of domestic 
violence, and hence failed to protect the victim from VAW. 205 For reasoning its decision the 
South African court recalled the country’s obligations to protect women, mentioning among 
others the CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol (para. 27). Likewise, in the case Mary Sunday v. 
Nigeria206 (2018), the Economic Community of West African States’ Court of Justice decided 
a case of access to justice of a domestic violence victim, in which the plaintiff alleged that the 
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Nigerian Government committed violations under the Maputo Protocol and the decision was 
partially favourable to the victim.207 
III. Council of Europe – Istanbul Convention (2011) 
1. Background 
Violence against women is the most prevalent women’s human rights violation in 
Europe and it is present in all the Members States of the Council of Europe (“CoE”). In regard 
to inter-partner violence, a study from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
carried out across all the Europe Union (“EU”) member states, demonstrates that among 
women that had ever had a male partner, 22% have suffered physical or sexual violence by 
them.208 Albeit the fact the EU member states are fewer in number than the member states of 
the CoE, the research results are believed to be indicative for the whole continent.209 
Notably, the CoE has been acting systematically in preventing and combating domestic 
violence, including the considerable number of cases tackling the issue by the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The court has several times applied the due diligence standard 
obligation in its decisions, and since 2007 it has been using the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) as a living instrument in addressing cases of domestic violence, 
following the international understanding of States’ responsibility, and therefore extending their 
obligations to acts of gender-based violence committed by private parties.210 In the context of 
gendered domestic violence, the matter was acknowledged initially in the cases Bevacqua and 
S. v. Bulgaria211 and Opuz v. Turkey212. In the last one, considered to be a landmark case on 
the subject, the Court held for the first time that under the ECHR, domestic violence “may be 
regarded as gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination against women”213, since 
women are victims of this violation disproportionately (para. 200). On the whole, the ECtHR 
case law has established that States’ failure to protect women from domestic violence may 
lead to a violation of diverse human rights, depending on the factual and legal backgrounds,214 
with most violations on the subject found under ECHR’s article 2 (Right to life), article 3 
(Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), article 8 (Right to respect for 
private and family life) and article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination). 
However, the CoE efforts to combat VAW are not restricted to the ECtHR case law. 
Particularly, in 2002 the Committee of Ministers adopted the ‘Recommendation (2002)5 on the 
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212 ECtHR, application no. 33401/02, Opuz v. Turkey, 09/06/2009. 
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Protection of Women against Violence’215 and later, between 2006 and 2008, the organization 
promoted a campaign “to Combat Violence against Women including Domestic Violence” 216, 
in which a task force was designated to evaluate the issue throughout Europe. At the end, the 
group of experts agreed on the necessity of a binding instrument to combat VAW and proposed 
the draft of a new convention, based on  “the gendered nature of the phenomenon of domestic 
violence and the structural causes of violence against women”217 Thus, the CoE founded in 
2008 the ‘Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence’ (“CAHVIO“), composed of forty-seven Members States’ representatives 
and with the aim to elaborate the new convention. In addition, CAHVIO’s meetings also had a 
strong attendance of international organizations and NGOs’ representatives. 
Based on the previous extensive work that had been done by the CoE on VAW and 
equality, and filling a previous normative gap present in Europe on the subject, 218  the 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence219  
(“Istanbul Convention”) was adopted in 2011 by the Committee of Ministers and came into 
force on 1 August 2014. Currently forty-five States and the EU have signed the Convention, of 
which thirty-four have already ratified it.220 The instrument is also open to signature by non-
member States of the CoE and international organizations, but so far only the EU has signed 
and not yet ratified it. In addition, in contrast to the already mentioned recent global increase 
in number of domestic violence cases, 221  both the Polish and Turkish governments’ 
representatives have mentioned intentions to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.222 In a 
statement in response to the news involving Poland, the CoE has considered the withdrawal 
manifestation “highly regrettable and a major step backwards”223.   
2. Istanbul Convention Overview 
The Istanbul Convention goals are extensive and the instrument has a ‘four Ps 
approach’: i. Prevention of violence (Chapter III), precisely requiring States to exercise due 
diligence in regard of acts of committed by private parties (article 5, 2.); ii. Protection and 
                                                        
215 CoE, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
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support of women and girls already subjected to violence (Chapter IV); iii. Prosecution of 
perpetrators, including criminal investigation and procedure law (Chapter VI); and iv. 
Integrated Policies (Chapter II), aiming to induce the States to adopt comprehensive and co-
ordinated policies carried out among different government agencies, NGOs and institutions 
(article 7)  – the latter being added later after the evaluation that VAW cannot be eradicated 
through isolated measures, rather, the issue calls for systematic and integrated policies.224 
Moreover, the Convention’s preamble recognizes that VAW is both a “serious violation 
of the human rights [...] and a major obstacle to the achievement of equality between women 
and men”225, in fact being a “manifestation of historically unequal power relations between 
women and men”226 that results in women being deprived of full emancipation. It is also 
acknowledged that not only women, but also girls are victims of gendered violence; while 
children, of both sexes, may be victims of domestic violence, including indirect victims - due to 
the fact that they may witness violence in the family (preamble).  
Hence, the instrument presents a broad definition of VAW, encompassing “all acts of 
gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological 
or economic harm or suffering to women [...] whether occurring in public or in private life”227, 
both in situations of peace or armed conflict (article 2, 3.). Further, the substantive law 
presented in the convention (Chapter V) includes both violence that exclusively happens to 
women (forced abortion or female genital mutilation), as well as other manifestations of 
violence that women suffer disproportionately more often when compared to men, like rape, 
harassment, sexual abuse, domestic violence, forced marriage and forced sterilization. 
Therefore, States are expressly required to criminalize a vast number of violations. In addition, 
the convention is innovative when requiring States to adopt protective measures for foreign 
women and includes the regulation of important issues regarding migration and asylum in a 
specific chapter (Chapter VII). 
Furthermore, the Istanbul Convention clearly differentiates ‘domestic violence’ from its 
general definition of ‘violence against women’, presenting an unbound definition for this 
violation:  “all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within 
the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not 
the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim”228. While the separate 
definition of ‘domestic violence’ emphasises the Convention’s commitment to combating the 
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issue, it also introduces a gender-neutral concept implying that men are also affected by this 
abuse. Significantly, this gender-neutral approach received some criticisms arguing that this 
decision may weaken the protection based on the structural VAW committed by men and on 
the women subordination.229 In fact, the genderless conceptualization of domestic violence is 
a controversial issue; while it is unquestionable that men and boys are also affected by 
domestic violence, treating the issue in a non-gendered form denies the social-political 
perspective of the issue, 230 ignoring the grave and systematic male violence against women 
and “thus nullifying the meaning of the very term violence against women and the rationale for 
the treaty in the first place”231. Further, some scholars argue that addressing domestic violence 
using a gender perspective helps to develop better policies and programs both for victims and 
perpetrators.232  
Nevertheless, the Istanbul Convention also recognizes that women are significantly 
more affected by domestic violence than men (preamble/ article 2, 1.), and the Convention’s 
Explanatory Report clarifies that States may decide whether or not to extend the Convention 
provisions to men and children victims of domestic violence, depending on the national 
situation and the development of the society.233 In addition, other scholars understand that 
since the Istanbul Convention clearly differentiates in the sense that States are ‘encouraged’ 
to consider male victims under the Convention’s scope (article 2, 2.) rather than ‘obliged’, thus 
the initial focus of the instrument - on preventing and combating VAW, whether it occurs within 
the family or not – remains preserved.234 
3. Istanbul Convention and the European Court of Human Rights 
The Istanbul Convention continues the previous work done by the ECtHR on domestic 
violence, codifying as the States Parties obligation important issues brought through cases 
decided and raised by the Court, which were also crucial during the Convention negotiations.235 
Nonetheless, despite the Istanbul Convention being a ground-breaking instrument, the ECtHR 
jurisprudence on domestic violence may still be developed under the ECHR,236 both because 
there is no direct mechanism for individual complaints under the new Convention and its 
monitoring mechanisms, although having potential, are in their initial stages, as observed 
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below. Furthermore, since the Istanbul Convention came into force, the ECtHR has often 
referred to the instrument,237 using the new Convention as a key guideline in determining 
States’ responsibilities while interpreting cases of domestic violence,238 and thus expanding 
the ECHR scope of application.239 For instance, in a recent case ruled on domestic violence, 
Buturugă v. Romania, the ECtHR emphasized that Romania did not take in consideration the 
special diligence required from States in the Istanbul Convention to deal with complaints of 
domestic violence.240 In addition, the Court has cited the Istanbul Convention also in judgments 
involving States not parties of the Convention, as in the case Volodina v. Russia, in which the 
ECtHR stressed that it would not refrain from citing the instrument, even with Russia not being 
party to it.241 Finally, it seems the ECtHR observes the Istanbul Convention as complementary 
to the ECHR, which demonstrates the Court’s case law will remain important in combating 
domestic violence in Europe. 
4. Mechanisms of Control 
 The Istanbul Convention has established two bodies to oversee its monitoring 
mechanism: the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (“GREVIO”) and the Committee of the Parties. The GREVIO is an independent expert 
body, today composed of fifteen experts responsible for monitoring the Convention 
implementation, with mainly three attributions: managing the States’ reports procedure, 
conducting an inquiry procedure (article 68) and issuing, when appropriate, general 
recommendations on matters related to the Istanbul Convention (article 69). On the other hand, 
the Committee of the Parties is a political body composed of States’ representatives (article 
67) that are responsible for the election of GREVIO’s members. Further, the Committee of the 
Parties shall meet at any time when required by one-third of the Convention’s parties, the 
Committee’s President or the CoE Secretary General (article 67, 2.) 
Therefore, the Istanbul Convention primary monitoring mechanism is a detailed report 
to be submitted by States based on a questionnaire drafted by the GREVIO, regarding the 
measures adopted for the implementation of the Convention (article 68, 1.). After receiving the 
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States’ reports, the monitoring body will develop its own report with conclusions on the 
measures embraced by the parties (article 68, 11.). During the procedure and when it is 
deemed necessary, the GREVIO may also conduct country visits (article 68, 9.). Further, the 
procedure also welcomes the participation of the general public and NGOs, allowing the 
submission of information directly to GREVIO (article 68, 5.). Finally, the Committee of the 
Parties may also issue specific recommendations to States Parties for implementing 
GREVIO’s final observations (article 68, 12.). 
Additionally, GREVIO may also conduct a special inquiry procedure when it has reliable 
information of situations requiring prompt action to prevent or limit serious cases of violence 
under the Istanbul Convention’s scope (article 68, 13./14.). When aware of this information, 
the Group of Experts may require from States an immediate submission of a report regarding 
the measures taken in regard of the violation in question. Based on this report or “any other 
reliable information available”242, GREVIO may initiate an inquiry procedure designating one 
or more of its experts for this duty, who must report back to GREVIO urgently (article 68, 14.). 
The procedure may involve an on-site visit to the State investigated, with its due consent. After 
the assessment of the inquiry findings, GREVIO will report them to the State involved, which 
may be followed with comments or recommendations of the Committee of the Parties and the 
CoE’s Committee of Ministers (article 68, 15.).  
Furthermore, GREVIO issued its first ‘General Activity Report’243 in April 2020, covering 
its activities from June 2015 until May 2019, summarising the findings that resulted from the 
evaluation of the first eight States’ reports. Significantly, the monitoring body criticized the 
gender-neutral approach of domestic law provisions in some countries (Albania, Sweden and 
Finland), pointing out that although the Istanbul Convention has a gender-neutral definition for 
domestic violence, the Convention also emphasizes that the violation is precisely gendered; 
while the mentioned countries failed to address the particularities experienced by female 
victims and therefore jeopardized their protection (para. 40). Further, the monitoring body also 
draws attention to the limited definition of domestic violence at national level in Portugal and 
Austria, not encompassing all the manifestations of the issue present in the Convention’s 
article 3, b (para. 42).  
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E. Violence Against Women – A Comparison 
I. Substantive law 
Firstly, as mentioned before, the CEDAW - the only international binding instrument 
with universal scope that protects the rights of women against gender discrimination – leaves, 
at first, out of its regulation one of the most serious forms of discrimination suffered by women 
globally: VAW, by virtue of being women. Therefore, the definitions used in the UN system, in 
regard to both VAW and domestic violence more specifically, are found in different legal 
documents, mainly in the DEVAW and General Recommendations 19 and 35, which through 
an extensive interpretation clarify that the CEDAW encompasses gender-based violence.  
Secondly, the Inter-American Belém do Pará Convention is the first international treaty 
that breaks the human rights paradigm that excludes from State’s responsibility acts committed 
by individuals, as they belong to the private sphere. Therefore, it regulates as VAW all forms 
of violence that take place in the family (implicitly including domestic violence), the community 
and the State. Finally, it obliges States to condemn VAW and to adopt measures for its 
prevention, punishment and eradication. 
Thirdly, within the African context, despite the fact that the Maputo Protocol is not a text 
specifically drafted to eliminate VAW, but rather to recognize women’s rights more generally, 
yet it contains important references to many types of gendered violence, and offers valuable 
and broad protection against these, in particular against harmful practices.  
Finally, in Europe, the Istanbul Convention came up as the most complete and 
advanced instrument on combating VAW in international human rights law, precisely 
describing the rights protected and detailing the standards for State’s protection of victims, 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, prevention of violations and integrated policies. 
Remarkably, the Istanbul Convention specifically protects from domestic violence, while it also 
creates a separate and gender-neutral definition for this violation, unbound from the general 
concept of VAW.  
Therefore, while the Belém do Pará Convention and the Istanbul Convention are the 
only binding treaties specifically formulated to combat VAW, generally speaking, all the above-
mentioned legal documents encompass the issue, explicitly or implicitly. Further, all the 
regional instruments analysed here have a similar concept for VAW, following the DEVAW 
definition of it. The Istanbul Convention and the Maputo Protocol go further and extend the 
concept to encompasses ‘economic violence’ suffered by the victims, while the CEDAW and 
the Belém do Pará Convention limit their scope to ‘physical, sexual and psychological 
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violence’. Nevertheless, the CEDAW jurisprudence 244  and the MESECVI Committee of 
Experts have already recognized ‘economic harm’ as a form of gender-based violece.245 
Perhaps the most divergence among these instruments, in our context, is the Istanbul 
Convention’s legal characterization of domestic violence separately from VAW and gender-
based violence, thus differing from the UN documents related to the issue (DEVAW, GR 19 
and 35), as well as the other two regional human rights instruments – all of them rejecting the 
gender-neutral concept of domestic violence and defending the position that the issue is a 
manifestation of VAW in the family, in which the man is the subject perpetrator and the woman 
the victim.246 
II. Mechanisms of Control 
The primary monitoring mechanism common to all the instruments herein analysed is 
the States’ Report procedure. The CEDAW, like other UN treaties, requires State Parties to 
present the report every two years; the Belém do Pará Convention and the Maputo Protocol 
established the same procedure, obliging States to submit progress reports on implementing 
the convention annually and the protocol every two years, respectively. Likewise, the main 
compliance mechanism under the Istanbul Convention is a reporting procedure, notably much 
more detailed than the others mentioned. In general, reporting mechanisms receive criticism 
related to the lack of compliance by the States that often delay submissions, and also the delay 
by the monitoring bodies in analysing the reports. Significantly, the GREVIO so far has been 
requesting two countries at a time to submit the reports, which seems to be an attempt to avoid 
the common backlog of reports as observed in other human rights systems.247 
Moreover, individual complaints have been allowing women to obtain judicial protection 
against different forms of gender-based violence at international level, proving to be a valuable 
and effective tool for women’s human rights protection. Thereby, under the CEDAW, the 
procedure is foreseen in the Convention’s Optional Protocol, which limits the number of States 
submitted to the mechanism, since not all CEDAW States Parties have ratified the Optional 
Protocol.  
In turn, the Belém do Pará Convention allows women to lodge petitions to the IACHR, 
which will later decide whether or not the case will be submitted to the Inter-American Court. 
However, some criticize the fact that women do not have direct access to the IACtHR, as well 
as the necessity of an express recognition of the IACtHR jurisdiction by the States. 
Nevertheless, a significant number of landmark cases have been decided by both the IACHR 
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and the IACtHR under the Belém do Pará Convention,248 some of them being considered as a 
reference on State’s due diligence obligation for private actors’ violations of human rights. 
 Further, although the Maputo Protocol does not directly allow individual complaints, 
the African Commission by extension may receive communications, since the protocol 
supplements the African Charter.249 The same applies to the African Court, however here, 
States also need to ratify a different protocol to be binding by the court jurisdiction. However, 
as mentioned before, the African Union jurisprudence on VAW is considerably limited; under 
the Maputo Protocol specifically, the African Commission has not yet analysed any case, while 
the African Court decided for the first time mentioning the legal instrument in 2018. 
Surprisingly, the Istanbul Convention does not contemplate the possibility of individual 
complaints to be lodged to GREVIO or to another body of the CoE, also excluding the 
jurisdictional control by the ECtHR. Nevertheless, the Court has already decided to draw  upon 
the Convention when assessing violations of the ECHR and it continues to develop its 
jurisprudence on cases of domestic violence after the Istanbul Convention came into force. 
In addition, both the OP-CEDAW and the Istanbul Convention provide for an Inquiry 
Procedure for urgent situations, which includes on-site visits to the country under investigation. 
Nonetheless, under the CEDAW, not all States are subject to this procedure, which is 
applicable only to those which ratified the OP-CEDAW, and the mechanism, which is also 
subject to an opt-out (OP-CEDAW, article 10), has been considered too bureacratic and 
underutilizied; while under the Istanbul Convention all State Parties are subject to it and no 
reservation is allowed to the mechanism (Istanbul Convention, article 68, (13) - (15) and article 
78), with its effectiveness being still uncertain since so far GREVIO has not yet utilizied it. In 
contrast, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights is allowed, although not through 
the Belém do Pará Convention, to conduct country visits for a general overview of human rights 
situations or to investigate specific matters,  which is considered to have an important political 
impact in the region.250 In addition, the African Commission may carry out investigations under 
article 46 of the African Charter, but the procedure is not very detailed and so far no inquiry 
has been conducted under the Maputo Protocol. 
Furthermore, although not legally binding, General Recommendations have been effective 
in guiding States on better implementing treaties in different human rights systems.251 Under 
the CEDAW, the Committee is entitled to issue General Recommendations under article 2, 1. 
Significantly, these statements were fundamental on the clarification that VAW is a violation of 
women’s human rights under the UN convention and the CEDAW Committee considers them 
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as authoritative statements. Moreover, within the Belém do Pará Convention, the necessity of 
an on-going evaluation process for the States’ compliance with the convention led to the 
creation of an independent agency, the MESECVI, in which its Committee of Experts, together 
with the CIM, have been issuing important detailed recommendations and guidelines for better 
implementation of the convention.252 Likewise, under article 45, 1.b of the African Charter ,the 
African Comission may issue General Comments or adopt guidelines and resolutions on 
different human rights issues. Notably, the African Commission has been using this 
mechanism to clarify provisions of the Maputo Protocol. Further, the Istanbul Convention in 
article 69 allows GREVIO to issue General Recommendations, having the Group of Experts 
recently established a work group to draft its 1st General Recommendation “on the Digital 
Dimension of Violence against Women”253.   
 
F. Conclusion 
The recognition of domestic violence as a human rights issue was the result of the 
feminist movement’s struggle, which faced primarily as a barrier for this achievement the 
boundaries created to separate public and private life that very often are used to contribute to 
reinforcing the patriarchy’s structure.254 On the whole, the guarantee of privacy protection in 
regard to State intervention within the family has lead to the perpetuation of the authoritarian 
relationship of male dominancy that limits women’s autonomy and independence. In addition, 
the international protection from domestic violence only started to be developed after the 
recognition of VAW as a human rights violation in 1993 and formalized in the DEVAW, which 
also extended to violence being committed in the private sphere. Thus, the public/private 
dichotomy that initially prevailed in international law, in which acts committed by private parties 
were not accounted for as the State’s responsibility, has been formally suppressed through 
the principle of due diligence. Hence, international human rights law today considers the 
prevention, protection, prohibition and punishment of domestic violence committed against 
women as the States’ responsibility. 
In this context, the human rights systems analysed here - global and regional - have 
shown a growing consensus in States’ due diligence obligation for cases of domestic violence, 
often referring to each other and with similar language in the reasoning of their decisions.255 
Thereby, although far from perfect and holding limitations, these systems have been playing 
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an important role in providing women international protection. At the UN level, the CEDAW 
Committee has developed vast jurisprudence interpreting the CEDAW as a living instrument 
and placing the DEVAW and GR19 as authoritative statements and key documents on the 
issue, being greatly cited in both national and international courts when ruling on VAW. 
Moreover, the Inter-American system through its highly ratified Belém do Pará Convention, 
was the pioneer international treaty to recognize the State’s due diligence for cases of VAW. 
The Convention also established relevant compliance mechanisms, including an individual 
complaints system that allow the victims to lodge petitions to the IACHR, with the possibility of 
a future intervention by the IACtHR - which resulted in important jurisprudence on VAW that 
established international standards, with global repercussion for women’s human rights 
protection. In addition, the African Union’s Maputo Protocol, albeit the most timid instrument 
among the others considered herein, is still a progressive legal document with valuable 
provisions that offers protection for women against some forms of violence. Furthermore, in 
Europe, the Istanbul Convention, learning from the case law of the CEDAW and the Belém do 
Pará Convention, came out as the most advanced and vanguard treaty on VAW and domestic 
violence - explicitly requiring the States to criminalize various forms of violations, and expressly 
recognizing the principle of due diligence. In addition, despite being in its initial stages the 
Convention holds great potential to protect women in the continent and perhaps globally – 
since it is open for accession by States not part of the CoE pursuant to article 76. 
Nonetheless, although all the progress that has been achieved at the international level, 
domestic violence remains widespread globally, either through physical, psychological, 
economic or sexual abuse. Further, the recent intensification in domestic violence cases in 
many countries during the COVID-19 lockdown shows how it is challenging to modify culture, 
traditions and social patterns that have intrinsic to them the idea of male dominance, thus 
reinforcing VAW and gender inequalities. In contrast, it is alarming that during the current crisis 
some governments have voiced intentions to withdraw their international commitments related 
to VAW, such as Turkey and Poland,256 while a dramatic number of women’s lives continue to 
be threatened daily. Thus, there is an urgent need to raise awareness about women living in 
abusive situations.  
In this sense, some scholars have been defending the necessity of a universal legally 
binding instrument on gender-based violence to reduce the deficiencies present in IHRL today. 
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore two points, often discussed by the international experts’ 
mechanisms on VAW: both the gap between the already existing norms on the issue and their 
implementation, and the gap between these global and regional treaties and the national 
laws.257 Therefore, a more efficient protection of women against domestic violence on an 
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international level should be focused on improving the application of the existing legal 
frameworks, on a global and regional level, and the adequacy of these norms with regard to 
national legislations. In order for this to succeed, further interaction and cooperation among 
the human rights systems is crucial. In fact, as we observed, they have been influencing each 
other, including in establishing legal precedents, as well as joining in cooperation to tackling 
VAW, such as the creation of the EDVAW Platform. Yet they can and should go beyond, 
intensifying efforts for learning from and reinforcing each other in order to help correct their 
deficiencies, thus creating a more consistent force to combat domestic violence.  
Finally, this paper argues that International Human Rights Law, from the perspective of 
the legal norms and mechanisms here analysed, has been an important and fundamental tool 
in protecting women against domestic violence, especially in holding States responsible when 
violations of women’s rights have already occurred. However, considering that despite all the 
progress achieved the problem remains endemic, the human rights systems should demand 
more from States in regard of measures to prevent VAW, thus reaching the roots of the 
problem - the economic, social and cultural reasons that perpetuate power relationships and 
place women at a disadvantage in the full enjoyment of their human rights.
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